Rocky Mountain Claim Staking v. William Frandsen : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
Rocky Mountain Claim Staking v. William
Frandsen : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Merlin O. Baker, Attorney for Appellee.
Thomas R. Karrenberg; Anderson & Karrenberg, Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Staking v. Frandsen, No. 930349 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5249
%Jf fa a £k tl \>° 
K e u 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN CLAIM STAKING, : BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
: WILLIAM FRANDSEN 
Plaintiff and Appellant, : 
: PRIORITY 15 
vs. : 
: Case No. 930349-CA 
WILLIAM FRANDSEN, : 
Defendant and Appellee : 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
Merlin O. Baker (#0180) 
3760 South Highland Drive #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 273-3958 
Attorney for Appellee 
William Frandsen 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
Scott A. Call (#0544) 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Appellant 
William Domichel, Assignee of 
Rocky Mountain Claim Staking 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
NOV 3 0 B93 
J. Mary T. Noonan 
V Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN CLAIM STAKING, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WILLIAM FRANDSEN, 
Defendant and Appellee 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
Scott A. Call (#0544) 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Appellant 
William Domichel, Assignee of 
Rocky Mountain Claim Staking 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
WILLIAM FRANDSEN 
PRIORITY 15 
Case No. 930349-CA 
Merlin O. Baker (#0180) 
3760 South Highland Drive #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 273-3958 
Attorney for Appellee 
William Frandsen 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW 4 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
A. Disposition of the Case Below 4 
B. Statement of Facts 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
I. A COLORADO JUDGMENT RENDERED WITHOUT JURISDICTION 
OVER THE DEFENDANT OR UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH 
VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IS VOID AND IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT BY THE UTAH 
COURTS 8 
II. WHERE THE ISSUE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION HAS NOT 
BEEN DETERMINED BY THE FOREIGN COURT WHICH HAS 
ENTERED A DEFAULT JUDGMENT, THE ISSUE MUST BE 
DETERMINED BY THIS COURT 8 
III. THE ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT IS ONE OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, NOT AN INTERPRETATION OF THE 
COLORADO LONG ARM STATUTE 9 
IV. THE ATTEMPTED EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION BY 
THE COLORADO COURT OVER THE APPELLEE, WILLIAM 
FRANDSEN, VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 11 
CONCLUSION 16 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
Bradford v. Naale, 763 P.2d 791 793 (Utah 1988) 
Cate Rental Company, Inc. v. Weyland and Co., 549 P.2d 
707 (1976) 
Data Management Systems, Inc. v. EOP Corp., 709 P.2d 
377 (Utah, 1985) 
Panos Inv. Co. v. District Court, 662 P.2d 180 
(Colo. 1988) 
Pettit v. American Nat. Bank of Austin, 649 P.2d 525 
(Okla., 1982) 
Ruggieri v. General Well Service, Inc. 535 F.Supp. 525 
(D. Colo. 1982) 
Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 448 P.2d 783 
(1968) 
Tucker v. Vista Financial Corporation, 560 P.2d 453, 
(Colo. 1979) 




 U R I S D I C T I 0 N mj) N A T U R E 0 F PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal iron the urder entered on May 17. L993 *i 
the ,T1Mrd Disf * • * 
„ « adicial JiSiruL ; ^ . .u: LdKe Cuunty. ::ai. supreme 
Court had appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant r. rt **• 
Code -—. -v •• •• . . • . 
adjudicate the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sees* 7 3-2-2< -
and 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT 
Whether the appeiiee, -uiiiuji . . jaaaeir
 v '^landsen"1 
relative t arranging tor ^ r ontrart-l na :r * an I."*-H
 a ^o]ora^n 
mining claxi: ,; . :ah^ ina subsequently sending a check for 
payment :.\:>li-: < :< W . +• JM'-1 r - **-=*h *--»-•' because 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to al low 
the Colorado Courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
a p p e l 11'i.' I1 f (iiii 111 ii "ill 
STATEMENT OF THE CI SE 
Disposition *•« t 
i „_ - -i n 
action against Frandsen Colorado District Cour 
Judicial District, on December ? S 'Q^ i>x P^ckv Mountain 
.Li^nuit^ check 
pursuant: to the penalty provisions o± a Colorado statute. Frandsen 
was properly served with the Colorado summons and complaint: (11. 
32) Frandsen did not appear or answer the complaint. 
On April 7, 1992, the Colorado District Court entered a 
default judgment against Frandsen for $25,500, three times the 
amount of the dishonored check, plus Court costs and interest. (R. 
2) There was no determination by the Colorado Court as to whether 
or not its exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper under the 
due process clause. (R. 2) 
On July 14, 1992, Rocky Mountain filed the Colorado default 
judgment in the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, 
County of Salt Lake. (R. 4). On March 10, 1993, the appellee, 
Frandsen, filed a motion in the Third District Court, on the 
grounds that the attempted exercise of personal jurisdiction by 
the Colorado Court, violated the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and accordingly the Colorado judgment was 
void. (R. 18) Both parties filed legal memoranda and supporting 
affidavits. 
On April 23, 1993, oral argument relating to Frandsenfs motion 
was heard by the Court. On May 17, 1993, the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson entered an order that the Colorado Courtf s attempt to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the appellee, Frandsen, was 
violative of the due process clause and accordingly the Colorado 
default judgment was vacated. (R. 94) 
B. Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff's claim arises out of a conversation which took 
place in Salt Lake City where the appellee, Frandsen, was employed. 
In February or March, 1991, David Waldner, President of the 
5 
plaintiff Rocky Mountain Claim Staking, came to the WRR Industries 
office in Salt Lake City and during the course of said visit, 
discussions were held between Mr. Waldner and the appellee, 
Frandsen, relative to the staking certain mining claims in Idaho. 
(R. 29) Mr. Frandsen advised Mr. Waldner that he had no funds to 
pay for any staking of the Idaho properties. (R. 29) However, Mr. 
Waldner said that he had a cabin in Idaho in the area of the mining 
claims and while he was at his cabin he would stake some of the 
claims. (R. 29) The defendant did not contract with, authorize or 
agree to pay the plaintiff to stake any of the Idaho mining claims. 
(R. 29) 
Subsequently the plaintiff advised the appellee, Frandsen that 
it had performed staking services in Idaho and demanded payment of 
$8,500 for said services. (R. 29) 
Although the defendant had not authorized the staking work, 
the plaintiff stated that he had performed the work and the 
appellee, Frandsen felt some obligation to pay for it. In late 
July or early August, 1991, Mr. Frandsen mailed to Rocky Mountain 
in Colorado an undated check in the amount of $8,500 drawn on a 
Salt Lake City bank and advised Rocky Mountain to hold the check 
until Frandsen had sufficient funds in his Salt Lake City bank 
account. (R. 29-30) 
On or about August 27, 1991, the appellee, Frandsen, advised 
Rocky Mountain to date the check August 27, 1991 and to cash the 
check. (R. 29-30) At this time the appellee, Frandsen, had 
arranged for a loan in order to have sufficient funds to cover the 
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check; however, the person who had agreed to make the loan to Mr. 
Frandsen did not make the loan and there were insufficient funds in 
Mr. Frandsen1s bank account to pay the checK. (R. 30) 
On December 16, 1991, the appellee, Frandsen, was served in 
the State of Utah, with the Summons and Complaint which the 
plaintiff had filed in the District Court of Boulder County, State 
of Colorado. (R. 30) The action was brought on the unpaid $8,500 
check. The plaintiff sued for treble damages of $25,500, and a 
default judgment in this amount was entered against the appellee, 
Frandsen. (R. 2 and 30) 
The defendant has never been a resident of the State of 
Colorado. (R. 28) The agreement, if any, was entered into in the 
State of Utah and if performed, was performed in the State of 
Idaho. (R. 29) The defendant has not conducted any business in the 
State of Colorado and did not file an Answer or appear in the 
Colorado action. (R. 28-29) The Colorado Court entered a default 
judgment against the appellee, Frandsen. (R. 2) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Two or three interstate phone calls between the appellee, 
Frandsen and Mr. Waldner of the appellant, Rocky Mountain Claim 
Staking, and the mailing of a check to Colorado which was not paid 
by a Utah bank are not sufficient minimum contacts under the due 
process clause to allow the Colorado Court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the appellee, Frandsen. Accordingly, the 




I. A COLORADO JUDGMENT RENDERED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER THE 
DEFENDANT OR UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE IS VOID AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT BY 
THE UTAH COURTS. 
In Data Management Systems, Inc. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377 
(Utah, 1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent a 
judgment debtor from collaterally attacking a foreign 
judgment on the ground of fraud or the want of 
jurisdiction or due process of law. Hobelman Motors, 
Inc. v. Allred, Utah 685 P.2d 544 (1984);p Van Kleeck 
Cremery, Inc. v. Western Frozen Products Co., 24 Utah 2d 
63, 465 P.2d 544 (1970). 
*** 
A foreign judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the 
defendant or under circumstances which amount to a lack 
of due process is not entitled to full faith and credit 
in Utah. [Emphasis added]. 
Id. at 379. 
Because the appellee, Frandsen, did not have sufficient 
contacts with Colorado to satisfy the due process clause, the 
Colorado default judgment entered against the appellee, Frandsen, 
is null and void and is not entitled to full faith and credit in 
the Courts of the State of Utah. 
II. WHERE THE ISSUE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION HAS NOT BEEN 
DETERMINED BY THE FOREIGN COURT WHICH HAS ENTERED A DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT, THE ISSUE MUST BE DETERMINED BY THIS COURT. 
The Colorado Court merely entered a default judgment. It did 
not take any evidence in person or by affidavit relative to what 
contacts, if any, the appellee, Frandsen had with Colorado which 
would justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. The 
Colorado Court made no determination of this issue. The issue as to 
whether or not the appellee, William Frandsen had sufficient 
minimum contacts with Colorado to satisfy the due process clause 
8 
must be decided by this Court. 
The Data Management case, supra p. 8, relied upon by the 
appellant, did not involve the issue of personal jurisdiction, but 
the issue of whether or not the service of process met the 
reguirements of due process. The issue of the validity of the 
Wisconsin service of process had been raised by the defendant in 
Wisconsin and had been fully and fairly litigated by the Wisconsin 
court and, accordingly, the default judgment was given full faith 
and credit by the Utah court. 
In the instant case, the Colorado Court made no determination 
as to whether or not the appellee, Frandsen had sufficient minimum 
contacts with Colorado so that the Colorado Court could exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the appellee without violating the due 
process clause. This issue is for this Court to decide. 
III. THE ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT IS ONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, NOT 
AN INTERPRETATION OF THE COLORADO LONG ARM STATUTE. 
The appellee, William Frandsen, was not a resident of 
Colorado. He did no business in Colorado. The oral agreement for 
staking services, if any, was made in Salt Lake City, Utah, and the 
contract, if performed, was performed by the plaintiff in the State 
of Idaho. The appellee, Frandsen, mailed a $8,500 check drawn on 
the West One Bank of Salt Lake City, Utah, to the plaintiff and 
advised the plaintiff to hold the check. He later phoned the 
plaintiff and advised him to negotiate the check. When the check 
was presented to the West One Bank it was not paid because of 
insufficient funds. The appellee, Frandsen, did not file an answer 
or appear in the Colorado Court. Under tiiese circumstances, the 
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appellee, Frandsen, as a matter of law, was not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Colorado Court because he did not have 
sufficient contacts with Colorado to satisfy the due process 
clause; accordingly, the Colorado default judgment entered against 
him is null and void and is not entitled to Full Faith and Credit 
and cannot be enforced in this state. 
The Colorado statute asserts jurisdiction over a person within 
the limits of the due process clause, for (a) the transaction of 
any business within the state; (2) the commission of a tortious 
act; (3) ownership, use or possession of real property and (4) 
contracts of insurance. Colorado Revised Statutes, 13-1-124. 
Contrary to the assertion of the appellant, the issue before 
the Court is not an interpretation of the Colorado long-arm 
statute, but whether or not appellee, Frandsenfs contacts with 
Colorado law were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the due 
procedss clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. The Colorado decisions cited by the appellant, 
although they may be instructive to the Court, are not binding on 
this Court on this constitutional issue. The Colorado Court made 
no determination as to whether or not Frandsenf s contacts with 
Colorado were sufficient to satisfy the due process clause. 
This Court must examine all of the facts and circumstances 
relative to Mr. Frandsen1s contacts with Colorado and determine 
whether under this particular set of facts, the constitutional 
requirements of the due process clause have been satisfied. 
The decision of a court of one American state does not 
have stare decisis effect in the court of another 
10 
American state. Such a decision may be considered if it 
appears to throw light on the question in issue, but it 
will be followed by the court of a sister state only if 
the reasoning of the decision is persuasive. 
Courts - 20 Am. Jur.2d, Courts, Sec. 203, p. 537. 
IV. THE ATTEMPTED EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION BY THE 
COLORADO COURT OVER THE APPELLEE, WILLIAM FRANDSEN, VIOLATES 
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. 
Both Utah and Colorado, pursuant to their long-arm statutes 
extend personal jurisdiction to the limits permitted by the due 
process clause. Where this is the case, the only issue to be 
decided by the Court is "whether or not the attempted exercise of 
jurisdiction offends the due process clause." Bradford v. Naqle, 
763 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1988). 
In determining whether or not the exercise of jurisdiction by 
a Court offends the due process clause, each case must be evaluated 
on its own specific facts. This is so because the test is "minimum 
contacts" and one minor factual difference can be the determining 
factor as to whether or not the test of "minimum contacts" has or 
has not been met. The Court in Pettit v. American Nat. Bank of 
Austin, 649 P.2d 525 (Okla., 1982), stated: 
It has been recognized that each case involving a minimum 
contacts question must be determined on its own facts. 
Id. at 528. 
Each case must be evaluated on its particular and peculiar 
facts to which the Court must apply certain basic constitutional 
principles established by the Courts to determine whether or not 
due process has been violated. 
In Bradford v. Naale, 763 P.2d 791 (1988), the Utah Supreme 
Court set forth the principles of due process in relation to a 
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Court's attempted exercise of personal jurisdiction: 
Due process required that before a court can exercise 
specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant, the defendant must have purposefully 
established minimum contacts with the forum state. 
Indeed, the defendant's conduct and connection with the 
forum state must be such that it should reasonably 
anticipate being hauled into court there. Once it has 
been decided that the defendant purposefully established 
such contacts, "these contacts may be considered in light 
of other factors to determine whether the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and 
substantial justice.'" This inquiry involves the 
interrelationship of the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation. 
Id. at 794. 
The appellant, in its brief, relies on some Colorado cases 
involving promissory notes in which the Colorado Courts have held 
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was appropriate. As 
indicated above, these cases are not determinative on the 
constitutional issue of due process that is before this Court. 
However, even the cases relied on by the appellant do not support 
the position that under the facts of this case the attempted 
exercise of jurisdiction by a Colorado Court does not violate the 
due process clause. 
The first Colorado case is Van Schaack & Co. v. District 
Court, 538 P.2d 425 (Colo. 1975). In this particular case, the 
Colorado Court allowed jurisdiction to be exercised over a third 
party defendant who had issued a letter of credit upon which a 
resident of Colorado had relied to extend the performance of a real 
estate contract involving real estate in the state of Colorado. 
The letter of credit was issued specifically and was relied on 
specifically by the plaintiff in agreeing to extend the real estate 
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contract. Under these circumstances, the Colorado Court held that 
the third party defendant had sufficient minimum contacts and had 
purposely availed himself of the privilege of acting in Colorado 
and causing important consequences there. 
The case of Tucker v. Vista Financial Corporation, 560 P.2d 
453, (Colo. 1979), involved whether or not Colorado would enforce 
a default judgment entered in California against a Colorado 
resident. The plaintiff, Vista Financial Corporation, brought an 
action in California. The defendant, Judith Tucker, had co-signed 
a promissory note. Herbert Tucker had signed the promissory note 
in California, and then mailed the promissory note and the 
supporting documents from California to Judith Tucker in Colorado. 
She signed the documents and the promissory note and then returned 
them to the California bank, which then disbursed the funds in 
California. The fact that the documents and the promissory note 
had been sent back to California with the expectation that the 
California bank would rely on the documents and dispurse funds in 
California to Mr. Tucker, was sufficient for the Colorado Court to 
hold that the California Court had personal jurisdiction. 
In the instant case, the Court must look at the total factual 
situation. The contract for staking services was made in Utah; the 
staking services were performed in Idaho. Appellee,Frandsen mailed 
a check to Colorado drawn on a Utah bank not a Colorado bank. The 
check was presented to the Utah bank for payment and was not paid 
because of insufficient funds. 
In the subsequent case of Panos Inv. Co. v. District Court, 
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662 P.2d 180 (Colo, 1988), the Colorado Supreme Court explained the 
rationale of the earlier Van Schaack and Tucker cases. In the 
Panos case, the defendant had executed a guarantee of a promissory 
note, which guarantee was to be performed in Colorado. 
As to the first element, a guarantee by its very nature 
is a purposeful act. The obligation to which the 
guarantee relates is payable in Colorado. Therefore, the 
performance or nonperformance of the guarantee in the 
event of a default by the makers will cause important 
consequences in Colorado. The second prong is satisfied 
because the cause of action against Panos Investment 
Company arose from the partnership's alleged failure to 
honor its guarantee to pay the promissory note in 
Colorado, as required by its terms, after the makers 
defaulted. Finally, the third element is met because the 
guarantee has a substantial connection with Colorado. 
Again, the salient fact is that the guaranteed obligation 
is payable in Colorado. It is not unreasonable to 
subject a guarantor to the jurisdiction of courts in the 
very state where an obligation is specifically payable 
when the makers fail to perform their obligations and the 
guarantee becomes operable. 
Id. at 182-83. [Emphasis added]. 
The appellant in its brief relies on the Colorado federal 
district case of Ruggieri v. General Well Service, Inc., 535 
F.Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982). This case actually supports the 
position of the appellee, Frandsen. The Court held that as to 
certain fraud claims there were sufficient contacts to allow the 
Court to exercise jurisdiction. However, the Court held that there 
were not sufficient minimum contacts to justify personal 
jurisdiction on the breach of contract claims. The defendants were 
Montana residents. The Court, in applying Colorado law, stated: 
On the breach-of-contract claims, this court may assert 
jurisdiction only if the defendants transacted sufficient 
business in Colorado connected with the contracts...I 
conclude that defendants did not do so. Jurisdiction is 
not proper in Colorado merely because one of the parties 
to the contract was a Colorado resident. See Automated 
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Quill, 455 F.Supp. at 432. Nor is jurisdiction proper 
merely because the defendants received a check drawn on 
a Colorado bank. This result is not changed because the 
defendants wrote several letters regarding the contract 
to the decedent in Colorado. [Emphasis added]. 
Id. at 535. 
In the Ruggieri case, the check was drawn on a Colorado bank. 
In the instant case, the dishonored check was drawn on a Utah bank. 
The facts in the instant case are similar to the Utah case of 
Cate Rental Company, Inc. v. Weyland and Co., 549 P.2d 707 (Utah, 
1976) and the Colorado case of Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, 448 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1968). 
In the Cate Rental Company case, the Utah Court held that it 
did not have personal jurisdiction of an Idaho resident even though 
there had been telephone calls between the plaintiff and the 
defendant discussing the rental and purchase of telephone eguipment 
on the average of five times a year for the past ten years; the 
eguipment was shipped from the plaintiff's offices in Salt Lake 
City to Idaho and the defendant sent checks for payment of the 
equipment from Idaho to Salt Lake City. 
In the instant case, the appellee, Frandsen had even less 
contact with Colorado than was involved in the Cate Rental case. 
In Safari Outfitters, the Colorado Supreme Court held that 
Colorado could not exercise personal jurisdiction over an Illinois 
resident. There had been long distance telephone calls between the 
Colorado plaintiff and the Illinois defendant which resulted in an 
agreement by the defendant to arrange an African safari, as well as 
the mailing of a check drawn on a Colorado bank. The Colorado 
Court stated: 
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Nor do the interstate telephone conversations, 
correspondence, and the receipt in Illinois by petitioner 
of checks drawn on a Denver bank by respondent Powers 
constitute acts by which the petitioner purposely availed 
himself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
Colorado, thus invoking the benefits of its laws. 
Id. at 785. 
The Colorado Court concluded: 
Under all of the circumstances disclosed by the record in 
this case, it would be a mere fiction to hold that 
petitioner had minimal contacts in Colorado sufficient to 
meet the due process test so as to enable a Colorado 
court to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over him. 
Id. at 785. 
The appellant essentially argues that any contact with a 
foreign state is sufficient to allow its Court to exercise 
jurisdiction over a resident of Utah. This is not the law. The 
Colorado Courts under the Colorado long-arm statute can only assert 
jurisdiction within the limits proscribed by the due process 
clause. 
The foregoing Utah and Colorado cases clearly hold that under 
the facts of this case the appellee, Frandsen did not have 
sufficient minimum contacts with Colorado to allow it under the due 
process clause to exercise personal jurisdiction over the appellee. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellee, William Frandsen, did not have the minimum 
contacts with Colorado which, under the due process clause, would 
allow the Colorado Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
him. Two or three interstate phone calls and the mailing of a 
check to Colorado which was not paid by a Utah bank because of 
insufficient funds is not a sufficient basis under the due process 
clause for a Colorado Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
16 
the appellee, Frandsen. 
Inasmuch as the minimum contacts by the appellee, Frandsen 
with Colorado were not present as required by the due process 
clause, the Colorado default judgment against the appellee, 
Frandsen is void, and accordingly the District Court was correct in 
vacating the judgment and setting it aside. The District Court's 
decision should be affirmed. 
DATED this (g^rh day of November, 1993. 
n 0. Baker 
ney for the appellee 
liam Frandsen 
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Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Civil No. 926962198 FJ 
Defendant Wiliam Frandsen's Motion to Vacate and Set Aside 
Plaintiff's Foreign Judgment having come on before the Court for 
hearing on April 23, 1993, and the Court having considered the 
legal memoranda and the affidavits submitted by the parties, and 
having heard the oral arguments of counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that plaintiff's Colorado judgment is 
vacated and set aside. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the cash bond previously posted 
by the defendant with the Clerk of the Court, may be released by 
the Clerk to the defendant's attorney. 
Dated this / ^ day of May, 1993. 
Homer F. Wilkinson, 
L District Judge 
EKW\fc\V I OOfU 
Approved as to form: 
fhomas R. Karrenberg 
Attorney for judgment assignee, 
William Domichel 
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I hereby certify that on the (H" day of May, 1993, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand delivered 
to the following: 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
THOMAS & KARRENBERG 
700 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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DISTRICT-COURT, BOULDER COUNtfY^ STATE OP COLORAEJO N^TOi-^ Sfo 1992 
CASE NO. 91CV2140, DIVISION 2 ~~~~ _____ ^^ 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ORDER ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT WI FRA^DSET'
t
^i^ 







THIS MATTER, coming on pursuant to Plaintiff's Verified 
Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, pursuant to Rule 55(b), 
C.R.C.P., and the Court having reviewed same and various 
affidavits filed in accordance with C.R.C.P. Rule 121, Section 1-
14, and it appearing that Defendant was properly served in this 
matter, that venue has been considered and is proper and that 
good cause exists for the entry of judgment against Defendant 
herein, judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff Rocky 
Mountain Claim Staking, a Colorado corporation, and against 
Defendant William Frandsen, in the principal amount of 
$25,500.00, together with interest of $370.74, court costs of 
$92.00, and interest on the entire applicable amount due from the 
date of judgment at the applicable legal rate. 
Dated this 0 day of 1992. 
HONORABLE RICHARD C. MCLEAN 
Judge of the District Court 
\1;* +'.n,o *-"£ foregoing wer* plzcad 
" i ' r Vi. v^-rral Tallinn o~~jc°<z *o 
* i pe-'G'.'. or at*orn-/s ir.dxatecf. 
Date >A -1 <* ^ Dy fV-~> 
ATTEST: TRUE COPY 
<K~T> 4 -13-q^ ' 
30'Ji.OEftCObNTV, u'-...- ~ . . j 
ePCW\^)\T ^ 
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?TATE OF COLORADO) ,,s 
• :• y JT i DP BOULDER) 
I i: E B R A L . GROSSER, C 1 e r k o f t h e DIS T R I C I C 0 U R T o f t h e 2 011 i J u d i c i a 1 
D i s t r i c t o f t h e S t a t e o f C o l o r a d o w i t h i n and f o r B o u l d e r C o u n t y , do h e r e b y 
c e r t i f y t h e f o r e g o i n g t o be a t r u e , p e r f e c t and c o m p l e t e c o p y o f 
ORDER ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT WII I/IA M FRANDSEN, CASE NUMBER, 
91CV2140-2 
In Testimony Wher eof, I have hereunto set my hand a 
affixed the seal of sa i d Cou rt, a 1: my office i n 
Boulder JULY 15 ;
 19 92 
ofodowiL , V _(Uxx)djL± 
C l e r k 
STATE OF COLORADO) 
COUNTY OF BOULDER) ss 
I, RICHARD c. MCLEAN ; , Judge of the DISTRICT COURT of the 
20'tf i Judicial District of the State of Colorado within and for the Coun t) 
of Boulder, do hereby certify that DEBR..A il GROSSER, whose name is 
subscribed to the foregoing Certificate of Attestation, now is, and was, at 
the time of signing and sealing the same, Clerk of the DISTRICT COURT of 
Boulder County aforesaid, and keeper of the records and seal thereof, duly 
appointed and qua! "if ied to office; that full faith and credit are and of 
right ought to be g i * en to all her official acts as such in all Courts of 
Record and elsewhere; and that her said attestation is in due form of law 
and by the proper of f i • :: eir 
Given under i i i ) hand anu . . jtf£% 15 
' ^ Qr/a'-^ 
.v be 
STATE OF COLORADO) 
COUNTY OF BOULDER) ss. 
I, DEBRA L. CROSSER, Clerk of the DISTRICT COURT of the 20th Judic ial 
District of the State of Colorado', w ithin and for Boulder County, do hereby 
certify that RICHARD C. MCLEAN , , „ _, whose genuine signature 
is appended to the foregoing certificate, was, at the time of signing ti te 
same, Judge of the DISTRICT COURT of Boulder ., of the State of Colorado, 
ju I> commissioned and qualified that full faith and credit are and of r ig 
ought to be given to al 1 I i is/her official acts as such, i i i a 1 1 Courts o ! ' 
Reocrd, ar id elsewhere. 
. In Testi mori) wher 8' :» f I 1 lav e hereunto set my hand ai i ::! 
affixed the s • = a I o f s a i d Co t i r t, a t my o f f i c e Bou1d e i 
C o l o r a d o , Of i J U L Y i 5 .„ 1 9 92, 
C l e r k 
: T r i P c « r t . 0 i * 4 / 9 2 ) 
X 
MERLIN O. BAKER 
Attorney for Defendant 
William Frandsen 
3760 South High]HI 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, .jia'.i i. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN CLAIM STAKING : 
Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
WILLIAM FRANDSEN 
VS. 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
WILLIAM FRANDSEN 
Civil No. 926962198 FJ 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
THE PLAINTIFF, WI l.l.l AM FRANDRRN, b*-Mm| first In I M/MIII im 
oath, deposes and says taat: 
1. ie is t.-it^  defendant _ his action and is a resident 
S =>" • 
2. Ihat i^iLe i ?13 he has been n resident of the State of 
Utah. Affiant has never resided in Colorado or conducted any 
b •>. 
3. That from February, 198 9 until June, 1992, affiant was 
employed as a sales representative for WRR Industries, Inc., 
EXHIBIT 1 { 
having its office in Salt l i ^ -'ounty, Utah, Affiant made no 
L'n February W L rsa..,, -., David Waldner, President of 
plaintiff Rocky Mountain claim Rtakinr •• * . +-t, WRR 
:. I 
visit, discussions were nei : oetween Mr. Waldner and the affiant 
relati "*- * * certain mlninc -lain^ +-M+- *-H- affiant ^ ^ an 
i : .^ :. • — ,-Jner 
that he had nc funds to d* any staking <*f ,*.:/ ,c -he Idaho 
properties. However, Mr, ' -> ' *h * \-- ' * 
iQdiiL .^i'3 area ^i ...**., J^ J
 ftAJ ^J.^  ^  I u I M U .iiia .^.a.Xfc! nt. »vub ?.**. n.xo 
cabin ne w*. :;i stake s.).;;-. tli. claims, Affiant **:d not 
contract v! + v 
any , mining t.iuj.ub. 
5. Subsequently the plaintiff advised the affiant that it 
t * , l * \ >: • f 
$8,50C, • ioi La;u ^ eivices. 
6 Although affiarc h=-' r "^ *- =»i!+-h^>i7' +-h^  °takinq wrrk 
t t-. ome 
obligation to pay foi • I cite July or - u:ly August, 1991, 
affiant mailed *'- + h* * ]aintiff an undated check in the amount of 
_ ... - L'.it^  bank and advised the 
plaintiff to hold the check until affiant had sufficient funds in 
his bank account, 
7 !n O T a. ,
 h . aiiiai. advised the 
plaintiff to date the check August . , 1991 and to cash the 
2 
check At f his time, affiant had arranged for a loan in order to 
h a w • f f :• •'"' > * .- : • . 
had agreed i-,: . . ,ac ^uau ;.- ,;..;. a i f i c i i . i t . KJ. JL U. l i v ^ u ill c i K O L i i 4_. _^ .^y ;.* - i 
and there were insufficient funds in affiant s banX account • 
pa* 
I" . ix December If -»™i affiant was served in the State of 
Uta> *'*' *-T- Summons and •-MnpJaint whi -h - k-- plaintiff had 
The action was brought on tin unpaid $8,L>GL *! check. 
The plaintiff claimed trnbl° d^'^r^ amount*PO ~ - •* - -0 n nn. 
Copies oi L. ...J . . , . .. _ ..L. ..-. „ „- LAII^ B. 
. f.fiant did not .-,;. >; : * ho Complain* , ::_: file an 
appearanr - "'"^ t.r: 4 * T • v : ** . 
., ,*. . v otuoi 0..1 . ^ i ii^aiaer county 
entered a DefauJ* Judgment against the affiant a.:.: a judgment ior 
copy i i thifc. Defauj t judyfaent i: attached db Exhibit ».. 
'•»•** •< lc<c» +- *f- plaintiff filed the Default 
and n :* Scii* LduLe County, bt.citc .,j LidL .-ee Exhibj i •*-, i'efauit 
Judgment. 
Assignment of Judgment, giving notice t ^ - plaintiff, Rocky 
Mountain Claim Stakina had n~ld tpd assignee the aforesaid 
Defaul .dgment t nil ... -~ : ^ L , . . _: , 
Notice of Assignment of Judgment is attachec a^ Exhibi• 
3 
FURTHhR kbb I AN"! ,1 1 I'I'll N O T 
Dated this f_ I y of March, 19 93. 
William /FrandseiO 
Subscribed ai. 'efore me this y day of March, 1993, 
i i i 
L 
ETHELYN J. TURNER I 
3780 South HJohtand Or. 
Salt Lake City.Dish 84106 
I My Commission August 28,1986 I 










1. [Full faith and credit to records and judicial tiona respecting the tern: 
proceedings of states.] and property of the 
2. [Privileges and immunities — Fugitives States.] 
.from justice and service.] I [G ,1 aranty of republican form of government 
3 |[ I1!, ^  ill of .states — Rules and regula and against invasion.] 
Section 1. [Full faith and credit to records and judicial 
proceedings of states.] 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may 
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Pro-
ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. 
e pan t- t 
1 
(1) Engaging in any act enumerated in this section by any person, w n e u 
not a resident of the state of Colorado, either in person or by an agent, 
subaits such person and, if a natural person, his personal representative 
j urisdictio n ICI f ; n e c o u r t s o f 11 11 s s t a t e c o n c e r n i n g a n y c a u s e o f a c t i i * 
from : 
(a) The t r a n s a c t i o n o f any business w i t h i n II h i s s t a t e ; 
Clii'l' The i ( .m iss ion of n t n r t i o i is act w i t h i n t h i s sta+pf 
( r ) • j | i e ownership, use, or possession u I anv i u ij 1 |i roper ty s i t u a t e d i i I.I i 
i:i t a t e ; 
Con t rac t i ng h i in - un* my person, p r o p e r l y , oi i i i»h lUb id i ny ui localud 
* N i •* ' t a te J i l l , III III in in Ill IIII iiiiiiiiiii mi of rontracting; or 
ntenance of ci Bali iaunial duaicilu within this state with rrnport 
issues relating to obligations for support to children and spouse in any 
action for dissolution of carriage, legal separation, declaration of invaJ id ity 
of aarriage, or support of children if one of the parties of the l a m a g e 
continues without interruption I II he doairiled within the state. 
Clll ') i he engagii ig o Il " sexual intercourse IIIIII I his •ilate as to an act.t>.. bi jujht 
in article A or article 6 of title 19, C. R- S- , with respect to a child who 
aay have been conceive d tin> « I hi.11 .11 • i f i irit p i rn11r" • r i •• • nf f r n r t h i r *.« ~ * ^  * « H 
pet it ion. 
r/i\\fc\r r? 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of November, 1993, a 
true and correct copy of the ADDENDUM TO BRIEF n I«'"" li'l'UljLUl!;, \ J1"I I.I.I i J 1 
FRANDSEN was hand delivered to the following: 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake Citv. r* . 
tyigi.o..-. O ^^^^0 
